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China’s practice of employing business sanctions to silence companies and individuals speaking 
out in favor of the Hong Kong protests has sparked concern among democracy and free speech 
advocates. This recent phenomenon, combined with Dwight Eisenhower’s rhetoric of “export-
ing democracy,” prompts the question: if the USA has engaged in policies aimed towards ex-
porting democracy, could China also export autocracy? This paper uses panel data for 180 
countries across 22 years (1996-2018) to examine the effect of a country’s trade with China as a 
proportion of its total trade on common indices of democratic freedom from the World Bank 
Group, Transparency International, and the Heritage Foundation. I find that the effects of trade 
with China are largely insignificant, and if significant are positive, indicating that fears of Chi-
nese autocracy exporting may be somewhat unfounded. My results suggest that ideology ex-
porting may truly be one-way: that is, that trade can make countries more democratic (at dif-
fering degrees, depending on starting conditions and the democracy of the trade partner) but 
not less, and that indices of democracy may be downward sticky.  
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Introduction 
In October 2019, Blizzard suspended an esports gamer and revoked his prize money after the 
gamer in question spoke out in support of Hong Kong protestors on livestream.1 The gaming 
company faced immediate backlash for placing business interests (specifically, connections to 
China) ahead of democratic principles of free speech. But this incident is far from isolated: a 
few weeks earlier, China cancelled NBA broadcasts on state-run television after Daryl Morey, 
general manager of the Rockets, tweeted a popular slogan used by Honk Kong protestors. Simi-
larly, the University of Queensland has been recently indicted in claims that the campus at-
tempted to stifle pro-Hong Kong sentiment in an effort not to endanger relations with China.  
These narratives have prompted renewed concern about China’s efforts/ability to leverage its 
market power to affect political climates (especially regarding rights to free speech) around the 
world. Similar to the post-Cold War notion of the domino effect, this concept hinges on the the-
ory of ideology diffusion across borders. If the USA has engaged in policies aimed towards ex-
porting democracy, could China also export autocracy?  
In this paper, I examine empirical evidence regarding the possibility of Chinese ideology export-
ing. I employ trade data for 180 countries across 22 years to find the effect of Chinese trade 
power on several standard indices of democracy. My results indicate that proportion of trade 
with China may actually be positively associated with indices of democratic freedom, possibly 
indicating a growth effect of Chinese trade. Conversely, given lack of significance in several of 
my regression results, it is also possible ideology exporting may truly be one-way: that is, that 
trade can make countries more democratic (at differing degrees, depending on starting condi-
tions and the democracy of the trade partner) but not less, and that indices of democracy may 
be downward sticky.  
 
 
                                                          
1 Activision Blizzard is an American video game company, known for producing online multiplayer games such as 
World of Warcraft, StarCraft, and Overwatch, among others.  
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Relevant Literature   
In 1954, Dwight Eisenhower expressed the since-popularized notion of the democratic domino 
effect. This idea, theorized in response to the post-Cold War political climate, addresses ideo-
logical spread across nations; it predicts that political ideologies can diffuse across country bor-
ders. In other words, the domino effect posits that powerful (economically, politically, geo-
graphically) nations can spread their political ideologies to their neighbors (or diplomatic part-
ners) through non-military means. This concept led to policymaking aimed towards “exporting 
democracy”—combatting the Soviet Union through democratic and economic sanctions, to 
both stifle autocratic regimes and incentivize development of democracies. Economists have 
conducted much research to examine the efficacy of these policies, but this question is still un-
der debate.  
Starr (1991) coined the metaphor of ideologies as a communicable disease. He noted (in exami-
nation of historical evidence) that ideological change tends to happen in waves, often within a 
geographical region, even in the absence of military intervention. He concludes that economic 
interdependence through trade and foreign direct investment acts as a significant motivator for 
political change.  
Past research has also been conducted on the effects of trade openness on democratic indices. 
Results from these studies have been varied, and sometimes in direct opposition with one an-
other. Csordas and Ludwig (2011) find evidence for the neighbor effect through geographic dif-
fusion, but do not find significance for the effect of trade openness. Conversely, Rigobon and 
Rodrik (2005) find significant negative effects, while Lopez-Cordova and Meissner (2008) find 
significant positive effects. These differences may be reconciled by the findings of Puga and Tre-
fler (2014), who note that the direction of the effect of trade openness on democratic indices 
depends on the relative economic conditions of trade partners, current political conditions in 
the country under investigation, and the political affiliation of trading parties. These factors are 
intuitively sound: it seems reasonable that a relatively large, democratic trade partner would 
impart greater ideological partner towards democracy than a smaller, autocratic partner.  
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Connecting this notion of democracy exporting to China specifically, Lin (2019) finds evidence 
for increased democratic outcomes for Chinese workers upon exposure to American foreign di-
rect investment. Though this study relates to foreign direct investment rather than trade (as 
mine does) it does show that China is demonstrably not exempt from “ideology exporting.” The 
paper mentions the “ideological convergence” associated with economic interdependence. In 
this study, as well as the majority of past work, the focus is on the export of democracy, meas-
ured through indices of freedom of speech, government effectiveness, control of corruption, 
and so forth.  
This led me to wonder: is this a two-way street? Is it possible to export other political ideolo-
gies? And therefore, can/does China exert pressure on governance through trade? To answer 
this question, I first did some background research on possible confounding effects on democ-
racy indices and endogeneity issues.  
Barro (1999) examines the determinants of democracy, and lists GDP per capita, primary 
schooling, income inequality, and the degree of achievement gap across genders to be crucial 
determinants of indices of free speech and governance. Csordas and Ludwig (2011) note that 
foreign aid, though a factor in influencing the stability of existing governmental structures, does 
not significantly affect ideology. Their paper also identifies strong geographic, regional differ-
ences in ideological diffusion. In sum, much of the work in this area concurs with Barro’s assess-
ment that the strongest predictors of democratic indices are GDP per capita and income ine-
quality.  
A potential endogeneity issue in my analysis arises from the possibility of China’s selection bias 
in trade partners. In other words, if China selects trade partners based on the degree of democ-
racy, whether by advantaging autocratic or democratic partners, the effect of Chinese trade on 
these same indices will be confounded in the data. However, Broich (2019) finds that China 
does not appear to select recipients of foreign direct investment based on their governance 
structure. Though this paper addresses trade and not foreign direct investment, it seems rea-
sonable that China does not select trade partners exclusively based on political ideology, 
though some features of more democratic partners may provide economic incentives to trade. I 
4
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describe my controls for these features in my empirical methodology section. Furthermore, as 
discussed in later in this paper, I use Chinese trade as a proportion of total trade rather than 
trade volume to control for some of these effects. 
 
Data 
For this analysis, I use panel data for 180 countries across 22 years (1996-2018), though some 
observations are missing from earlier years, especially in developing economies.  
I use goods trade data by country at the yearly level, taken from Comptrade. These data include 
trade from the country in question to all trade partners (World) and with China specifically, in 
each year. I also sourced China’s total trade data by year from Comptrade. From the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, I sourced basic macroeconomic indicators, such as GDP per capita, GDP 
growth, unemployment, and inflation. I drew several indices from the World Bank, such as the 
Gini income inequality indicator and an index of trade openness. I also used World Bank data on 
population by country and year.  
I drew most of my indices of democracy from the World Bank Group (WBG). I also used Trans-
parency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (henceforth referred to as TI’s CPI), and 
the Heritage Foundation’s measures of economic freedom (Economic Freedom Index, or EFI). 
Both WBG indices are measured on a scale from -2.5 (less voice/accountability and government 
effectiveness) to 2.5 (strong voice/accountability and effective government). The Voice and Ac-
countability Index (VAI) measures perceptions of freedom of expression, as well as the degree 
to which a country’s governing body is held accountable by the citizenry. The Government Ef-
fectiveness Index (GEI) measures the availability and quality of public services, and surveys of 
trust in government/civil offices. Transparency International’s CPI is measured on a scale from 0 
(corrupt) to 100 (not corrupt) and is drawn from opinion surveys and expert assessments. The 
Heritage Foundation’s EFI is a more general index taking into account rule of law, government 
size, regulatory efficiency, and market openness. This index falls on a scale of 0 (not free) to 100 
(free).  
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These data are matched by year and three letter country code. Table 1 shows summary statis-
tics for the variables used in my analysis: each of the indices of democracy described above, 
propWithChinaTot (proportion of a country’s total trade that is conducted with China—the tot 
suffix indicating that this variable represents share of total goods trade as opposed to imports 
or exports exclusively), lGDPpc (the log of GDP per capita), an index of trade openness, the Gini 
income inequality index, and population in millions. 
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 
Initial analysis of my data supported the literature’s emphasis on GDP per capita as an im-
portant determinant of democracy, and therefore an important control variable in my regres-
sions. Graphical analysis showed an exponential relationship between GDP per capita and the 
democratic/freedom indices. For this reason, as well as to facilitate analysis, I use the log of 
GDP per capita throughout my empirical process.  
Figure 1 shows the relationship between the four primary indices I use in my analysis and GDP 
per capita: the WBG’s Voice and Accountability Index (top left) and Government Effectiveness 
Index (top right), Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (bottom left), and 
the Heritage Foundation’s Overall Economic Freedom Index (bottom right). These graphs show 
clear correlation between these indices and GDP per capita. 
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Figure 1: Democratic Indices and log GDP per capita 
 
I performed the same visual analysis for other control variables and saw similar results. As ex-
pected, the log of GDP per capita and the trade openness index were positively correlated with 
democratic indices. Interestingly, the Gini income inequality index also showed positive (though 
weak) correlation with all four indices of democratic freedom, likely resulting from relatively 
high levels of income inequality in developed nations.  
To examine evidence for the issue of autocracy exporting at a glance, I also graphed each de-
mocracy index against my primary independent variable: the share of a country’s trade con-
duced with China. Figure 2 shows the relationship between each index and the aforementioned 
variable, labeled propWithChinaTot. 
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Figure 2: Democratic Indices and Proportion of Trade Conducted With China
 
Contrary to the domino effect hypothesis, these scatterplots appear to indicate a positive (if 
slight) correlation between the proportion of trade conducted with China and all four of the 
democratic indices. Following sections will analyze whether this effect persists when controlling 
for the determinants of democracy identified in the literature review section. 
 
Empirical Analysis  
To examine the applicability of the ideology exporting theory to the case of Chinese trade, I 
used as my primary explanatory variable the proportion of a country’s trade which it conducts 
with China. I calculated this variable for each country and year by the formula below: 
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑖𝑡 + 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑖𝑡
 
where the subscript i indicates country and the subscript t indicates year.  
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In keeping with the literature, I included the log of real GDP per capita and the Gini inequality 
index as control variables. To capture factors associated with democracy that may facilitate 
trade (and thereby engender endogeneity) I also control for trade openness, measured by total 
imports and exports over real GDP. Additionally, I include population as a proxy for market size, 
to address China’s selection bias in export markets. Thus, my first regression equation is as fol-
lows:  
Regression 1: 
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑙𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀  
In the regression above, DemocracyIndex indicates each of my four primary dependent varia-
bles (described in the data section), propWithChinaTot is the proportion of total trade that is 
conducted with China, lGDPpc is the log of real GDP per capita, Gini is the Gini income inequal-
ity index, tradeOpen is a measure of trade openness, and population is total population in mil-
lions. This regression includes country (𝛾𝑖) and time (𝛾𝑡) fixed effects, with country and time 
subscripts as above. Table 2 below shows the results of this regression.  
Interestingly, the only significant coefficient on my independent variable of interest indicates a 
positive relationship between proportion of a country’s trade conducted with China and the 
VAI. This finding runs counter to my hypothesis, founded on my motivating articles and relevant 
literature, which suggest that we should instead see a negative pressure on freedom of speech 
due to trade from a relatively restrictive country (China). Furthermore, given that the VAI is cal-
culated on a scale from -2.5 to 2.5, the magnitude of this coefficient is also notable. Though this 
result may have arisen from data concerns (discussed further in this section), it could also be 
that trade from China exerts pressure on democratic indices not only through ideological diffu-
sion (or intentional economic pressure on political systems) but also through a growth channel. 
Especially for developing economies, trade with a relatively large, exporting economy (here, 
China) may increase overall welfare, which per Lipset’s seminal paper (1959) has a positive ef-
fect on democracy. This effect may therefore be outweighing any potential negative effects of 
ideology exporting.  
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Also surprisingly, my control variables seem only sporadically significant. Though log of GDP per 
capital is strongly significant in both my Corruption and Economic Freedom regressions, in the 
latter case this coefficient is negative. The coefficient on trade openness is likewise negative in 
this regression, though small in magnitude. This seems counterintuitive, given that Starr (1999) 
lists both of these factors as strong determinants of democracy.  
Given that political systems and institutions tend to be entrenched and relatively inelastic, I also 
ran a regression using one- and two-year lagged variables of the proportion of trade conducted 




* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                                    
F                           5.804           1.657           19.15           11.94   
R-sq                        0.048           0.014           0.167           0.073   
N                             723             722             606             906   
                                                                                    
                           (1.18)          (0.21)          (0.56)         (18.76)   
Constant                    0.196          0.0362           3.102           93.47***
                          (-2.58)         (-0.95)         (-2.48)          (0.90)   
population              -0.000998*      -0.000382         -0.0230*         0.0109   
                          (-0.78)          (1.01)          (1.55)         (-4.14)   
tradeOpen               -0.000353        0.000478          0.0207         -0.0570***
                           (3.43)         (-1.41)         (-0.42)         (-1.82)   
Gini                      0.00486***     -0.00208         -0.0177         -0.0855   
                          (-1.62)          (1.06)          (8.39)         (-5.41)   
lGDPpc                    -0.0278          0.0191           4.765***       -2.747***
                           (2.63)          (1.77)          (0.64)         (-0.11)   
propWithChinaTot            0.309**         0.221           4.987          -0.373   
                                                                                    
                       Voice&Acc.      GovEffect.      Corruption      EcnFreedom   
                                                                                    
Table 2: OLS Fixed Effects Regression Results of Proportion of Trade With China
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Regression 2: 
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖(𝑡−1) +
𝛽3𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖(𝑡−2) + 𝛽4𝑙𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀  
All other variables are as described in Regression 1. The results of this regression are shown in 
Table 3 below.  
 
In this regression, coefficients on both the immediate and lagged variables for proportion of 
trade with China were insignificant across the board. This seems to imply that, controlling for 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                                    
F                           4.040           1.662           13.27           10.66   
R-sq                        0.054           0.023           0.169           0.108   
N                             640             640             587             762   
                                                                                    
                           (1.45)          (0.74)         (-0.18)         (16.84)   
Constant                    0.251           0.146          -1.376           98.87***
                          (-2.63)         (-0.88)         (-2.70)          (0.70)   
population              -0.000919**     -0.000350         -0.0250**       0.00869   
                          (-0.11)          (1.16)          (1.48)         (-3.88)   
tradeOpen              -0.0000508        0.000583          0.0200         -0.0583***
                           (2.60)         (-2.16)         (-0.27)         (-2.24)   
Gini                      0.00363**      -0.00343*        -0.0119          -0.114*  
                          (-1.86)          (0.86)          (5.83)         (-6.43)   
lGDPpc                    -0.0314          0.0165           4.164***       -3.650***
                          (-1.09)         (-0.93)          (0.75)          (1.72)   
propWC(t-2)                -0.158          -0.154           5.779           7.860   
                           (1.86)          (0.78)          (0.98)         (-1.94)   
propWC(t-1)                 0.251           0.121           8.027          -9.350   
                           (1.69)          (1.36)          (1.11)          (1.62)   
propWithChinaTot            0.235           0.216           9.972           8.164   
                                                                                    
                       Voice&Acc.      GovEffect.      Corruption      EcnFreedom   
                                                                                    
>  Lagged Variables
Table 3: OLS Fixed Effects Regression Results of Proportion of Trade With China, With
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effects across time, the proportion of a country’s trade conducted with China is in fact not a 
strong contributing factor to democratic indices, running counter to the ideology exporting the-
ory. However, this insignificance may also arise from the reduction in observations inherent in 
time lagged analysis. Furthermore, since data were sparse for developing countries, these re-
sults may miss across-time effects in these emerging economies—the very countries one would 
expect to be most vulnerable to political pressure, by the size-difference effect identified by 
Puga and Trefler (2014). 
Though not significant at the 5% significance level, some of the coefficients in Table 3 were sig-
nificant at the 90% level. The one-year lagged trade variable in the EFI regression had a p-value 
of 0.053: this large negative coefficient (the EFI is calculated on a scale of 0-100) conforms to 
the ideology exporting idea, implying that an increased proportion of trade in the previous year 
may result in a lowered EFI for the next year. Similarly, the coefficient on the current propor-
tion of trade and the one-year lag trade in the VAI were also significant at the 10% significance 
level, with p-values of 0.092 and 0.063, respectively. However, these coefficients were positive: 
as in Regression 1, perhaps indicating that trade pressures against free speech are outweighed 
by positive growth effects. It may also be the case that China had the capability but not the in-
centive to exert economic pressure against free speech in the time period examined by this 
study. Additionally, these freedom indices are measured yearly and have little variation within a 
country by year. If trade pressures against free speech are being exerted in this case, my data 
may be too coarse to fully capture these effects.  
Another important facet of the previous literature on this topic was the theory of geographical 
diffusion: that is, the spread of political ideology across borders within a geographic region. This 
meshes with the gravity theory of trade, which has been strongly supported by empirical data 
and states countries trade more with proximate partners. To control for both of these effects, I 
interacted my primary independent variable with their countries’ UN Geoscheme region. I used 
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Regression 3: 
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑖 +
𝛽3𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽4𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑖 +
𝛽5𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑙𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽8𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽9𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀  
Where Asia, Americans, Oceania, and Africa are dummy variables taking the value 1 if the coun-
try in question is in the given region and 0 otherwise, with Europe as the base case. Table 4 
shows the results of this regression for my four dependent variables: 
 * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                                    
F                           5.024           4.427           11.19           7.154   
R-sq                        0.073           0.065           0.176           0.078   
N                             723             722             606             906   
                                                                                    
                           (2.14)          (0.15)         (-0.33)         (18.72)   
Constant                    0.367*         0.0269          -2.879           95.94***
                          (-2.42)         (-1.58)         (-2.79)          (1.06)   
population              -0.000938*      -0.000630         -0.0265**        0.0130   
                           (3.56)         (-1.53)         (-0.80)         (-1.79)   
Gini                      0.00500***     -0.00222         -0.0352         -0.0840   
                          (-0.64)          (0.83)          (1.34)         (-3.94)   
tradeOpen               -0.000289        0.000386          0.0184         -0.0544***
                          (-1.62)         (-0.56)          (6.48)         (-4.77)   
lGDPpc                    -0.0293         -0.0104           4.423***       -2.591***
                           (0.81)         (-0.75)         (-0.77)          (1.37)   
Africa*propWC               0.330          -0.317          -40.48           14.94   
                           (3.52)          (1.26)         (-0.79)          (1.48)   
Oceania*propWC              1.184***        0.443          -91.68           15.15   
                           (2.74)          (0.12)         (-1.00)          (1.20)   
Americas*propWC             0.947**        0.0416          -51.85           11.92   
                           (0.54)          (4.92)          (0.11)         (-0.77)   
Asia*propWC                 0.379           3.559***        5.689          -16.96   
                          (-1.59)         (-0.04)          (0.84)         (-1.36)   
propWithChinaTot           -0.428         -0.0123           43.61          -10.46   
                                                                                    
                       Voice&Acc.      GovEffect.      Corruption      EcnFreedom   
                                                                                    
>  Region Dummy Variables
Table 4: OLS Fixed Effects Regression Results of Proportion of Trade With China, With
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Controlling for region, the coefficient on propWithChinaTot is insignificant in all four regres-
sions, even at the 10% significance level. I had thought that this effect may be induced by small 
sample size: thus, I ran the regression removing my limiting variable, Gini (the Gini income ine-
quality index, which was missing for many of the early years of my dataset). Even after doing so, 
however, all four coefficients remained insignificant. This result corroborates the findings of the 
lagged regression (Regression 2), seeming to support the notion that China does not appear to 
be exerting economic pressure on political structure broadly across the time period of this 
study.  
Several of the region dummy interactions, on the other hand, were significant: for the VAI re-
gression, countries in the Americans and Oceania experienced stronger effects of Chinese trade 
on the index in question than countries in Europe. If accepting the idea of the growth channel 
between Chinese trade and this index, the positive coefficient on countries in the Americas may 
be explained by the greater size difference between China’s economy and those of developing 
nations in Central and South America. Likewise, the even larger positive coefficient on the inter-
action term with Oceania may indicate a similar growth channel, strengthened by the geo-
graphical proximity to China, of the Southeastern Asian countries included in the region by UN 
Geoscheme data.  
Finally, I considered the possibility that China may be reluctant to exert trade pressure on its 
major partners, as China may also be dependent on continued trade. To this end, I calculated 
the proportion of trade China conducts with each country in my dataset (by country and year) 
via the following formula:  
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑂𝑓𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 =  
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑡 + 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑖𝑡
𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑡 + 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑒 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠𝑡
 
I included in this regression the region dummies above, making the full regression equation: 
Regression 4: 
𝐷𝑒𝑚𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑂𝑓𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽3𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 + +𝛽4𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑠𝑖𝑎𝑖 +
𝛽5𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑚𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽6𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑂𝑐𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑖𝑎𝑖 +
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𝛽7𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑊𝑖𝑡ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝐴𝑓𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑖 + 𝛽8𝑙𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑝𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐺𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑑𝑒𝑂𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽11𝑝𝑜𝑝𝑢𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑖 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝜀  
The results of the regression are included below:  
 
As in the previous regression all current coefficients on proportion of trade with China are insig-
nificant. The region dummy interactions mentioned in the results of Regression 3 retain their 
significance and their sign. Coefficients on both the proportion of Chinese conducted trade con-
ducted with a country (propOfChinaTot) and the interaction term are slightly significant (at the 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001
t statistics in parentheses
                                                                                    
F                           3.380           4.922           10.93           5.592   
R-sq                        0.062           0.088           0.219           0.081   
N                             709             709             565             848   
                                                                                    
                           (1.93)          (0.94)         (-1.76)         (17.59)   
Constant                    0.337           0.166          -16.63           95.25***
                          (-2.47)         (-1.47)         (-4.01)          (1.28)   
population              -0.000951*      -0.000575         -0.0413***       0.0157   
                           (3.31)         (-2.39)         (-0.94)         (-1.04)   
Gini                      0.00472**      -0.00346*        -0.0437         -0.0529   
                          (-0.87)          (0.31)          (0.74)         (-3.40)   
tradeOpen               -0.000400        0.000146          0.0103         -0.0493***
                          (-1.26)         (-0.23)          (6.00)         (-4.13)   
lGDPpc                    -0.0231        -0.00438           4.123***       -2.371***
                           (0.95)         (-1.11)         (-2.37)          (1.55)   
Africa*propWC               0.399          -0.470          -135.8*          18.53   
                           (2.69)          (0.73)         (-1.49)         (-0.09)   
Oceania*propWC              1.004**         0.277          -176.2          -1.081   
                           (2.78)         (-0.17)         (-2.58)          (1.07)   
Americas*propWC             0.968**       -0.0589          -145.8*          10.85   
                           (0.68)          (3.69)         (-1.40)         (-1.57)   
Asia*propWC                 0.509           2.789***       -80.74          -38.02   
                          (-1.52)         (-0.24)         (-0.28)          (2.44)   
WChina*OfChina             -25.96          -4.181          -228.5          1245.1*  
                           (1.46)         (-0.29)          (0.29)         (-2.47)   
propOfChinaTot              12.99          -2.660           126.6          -658.0*  
                          (-1.57)          (0.25)          (2.46)         (-1.48)   
propWithChinaTot           -0.428          0.0700           139.3*         -11.70   
                                                                                    
                       Voice&Acc.      GovEffect.      Corruption      EcnFreedom   
                                                                                    
> uding Proportion of Chinese Trade
Table 5: OLS Fixed Effects Regression Results of Proportion of Trade With China, Incl
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95% level). The coefficient on proportion of China’s trade is negative, seeming to indicate that 
China may in fact select trade partners with a slight bias towards less democratic governments. 
Conversely, the coefficient on the interaction term is positive and immense, possibly implying 
that the growth channel between trade and democratic indices is strengthened by China’s in-




Overall, most of my regressions indicated a lack of significance in the relationship of Chinese 
trade to the four selected democratic indices. When identified, these coefficients were typically 
positive, alluding to the possibility of a growth channel between trade and democracy exceed-
ing any negative effects of ideology exporting.  
Additionally, it may be possible that ideology exporting truly is one-way: that is, that trade can 
make countries more democratic (at differing degrees, depending on starting conditions and 
the democracy of the trade partner) but not less. These democracy indices may be somewhat 
sticky, in which case trade is unlikely to decrease these indices even when conducted with a 
powerful, autocratic partner.  
However, these conclusions may also have been influenced by possible endogeneity between 
proportion of trade with China and these indices. Though I used proportion of trade to attempt 
to rectify this issue, this proxy relies upon the assumption that factors affecting trade decisions 
are relatively common across nations; in other words, that a factor inducing China to trade 
more with Country X would also incentivize other economies to trade with this country, render-
ing China’s proportion of trade unchanged. I have included region dummies to address the obvi-
ous flaw in this approach (the gravity model of trade), but other factors likely also muddle this 
relationship (such as a possible selection bias towards autocratic trade partners).  
Further work would ideally further explore such confounding elements. Also, much of the prior 
work in this area concerns foreign direct investment rather than trade: it could be interesting to 
16
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test similar regression models using proportion of FDI received from China. Additionally, further 
research could address services trade as well as goods trade, for which data for this analysis 
was sadly sparse. In several years, it would be interesting to see a reanalysis of the notion of 
ideology exporting specifically with regards to expressing opinions about the Hong Kong pro-
tests, which served as the inciting incident for this paper.  
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